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
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Anmerkung aus dem Handexemplar der IZ-Historiker, offensichtlich in der Handschrift Krausnicks, zu Hilbergs Beurteilung der immer radikaleren Judenpolitik deutscher Funktionäre im besetzten Polen: "Hitler war entscheidend".

Concentration / 125

The concentration was carried out with much more drastic dispatch than had been dared in the Reich-Protektorat region. The newly occupied Polish territory was, in fact, an area of experimentation. Within a short time the machinery of destruction in Poland overtook and outdid the bureaucracy in Berlin.

There were three reasons for this development. One is to be found in the personnel composition of the German administration in Poland. As we shall see, that administration had a large number of party men in its ranks. It was less careful, less thorough, less "bureaucratic" than the administration in the Reich.

Another, more important reason for the unhesitating action in the East was the German conception of the Pole and of the Polish Jew. In German eyes a Pole naturally was lower than a German and a Polish Jew lower (if such a thing was possible) than a German Jew. The Polish Jew was on the bot-

Hitler
war
entscheidend

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
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